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COPS	TOP	RESPECTED	JUSTICE	
PROFESSIONS
Police officers are 
more respected by 
C a n a d i a n s t h a n 
judges, lawyers or 
lawmakers. In a recently released Canada wide 
Insights West poll, police officers earned the most 
respect among  Canadians of all other justice 
professions. The survey, which asked Canadians 
about 27 occupations, saw police  officers attain a 
76% positive opinion of their professions followed 
by judges (65%), lawyers (48%) and politicians (law 
makers) at 23%. 
Fast Facts
• More men (77%)  held a higher view of police
than women (75%).
• The older the person, the higher their
admiration for the police.
• Except for Atlantic Canada, the further west one
lived, the higher their opinion of the police.
• The higher one’s household income, the more
they respected the police.
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Province/Region Very or Somewhat positive opinion
BC 85%
Alberta 83%
Manitoba/Saskatchewan 80%
Ontario 72%
Quebec 70%
Atlantic 77%
Household income Very or Somewhat positive opinion
less than $50,000 71%
$50,000 > $100,000 80%
more than $100,000 84%
Continued on page 9
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Upcoming Courses
Advanced	Police	Training
Advanced training provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training  is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC	Police	Academy
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
NEW JIBC Graduate 
Certificate in Public 
Safety Leadership
2016 
BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL
This year’s Memorial Service will be hosted by 
the Vancouver Police Department and Delta 
Police Department.
Date & Time:
Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 1:00 PM
Location:
Brockton Oval in Stanley Park, Vancouver, BC
see 
pages  
31-32
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WHAT’S	NEW	FOR	POLICE	IN	
THE	LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Designing  adaptive and personalized learning 
environments.
Kinshuk.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2016.
LB 1031 K415 2016
Effective succession planning:  ensuring  leadership 
continuity and building talent from within.
William J. Rothwell.
New York, NY: Amacom, 2016.
HD 57.7 R689 2016
First Nations in Canada.
James S. Frideres.
Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press, 2016.
E 78 C2 F723 2016
The happiness equation:  want nothing  + do 
anything = have everything.
Neil Pasricha.
New York, NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2016.
BJ 1481 P38 2016
How to teach adults: plan your class, teach your 
students, change the world.
Dan Spalding.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, a Wiley Brand, 2014.
LC 5225 T4 S67 2014
Journey to healing:  Aboriginal  people with 
addiction and mental health issues: what health, 
social service and justice workers need to know.
edited by Peter Menzies and Lynn F. Lavallée; 
foreword by Elder Vern Harper.
Toronto, ON: CAMH, 2014.
RC 451.5 I5 J69 2014
Millennials who manage: how to overcome 
workplace perceptions and  become a great 
leader.
Chip Espinoza & Joel Schwarzbart.
Indianapolis, IN: Pearson Education, 2016.
HF 5549.12 E77 2015
The organized mind: thinking  straight in the age 
of information overload.
Daniel J. Levitin.
Toronto, ON: Allen Lane, 2014.
BF 444 L49 2014
Originals:  how non-conformists change the 
world. 
Adam Grant; foreword by Sheryl Sandberg.
London: WH Allen, 2016.
HD 53 G742 2016
Riding  the waves of culture: understanding 
diversity in global business.
Fons Trompenaars & Charles Hampden-Turner.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2012.
HF 5549.5 M5 T76 2012
Talking  to crazy:  how to deal with the irrational 
and impossible people in your life.
Mark Goulston.
New York, NY: AMA, 2015.
BF 637 I48 G68 2015
Therapeutic nations: healing  in an age of 
indigenous human rights.
Dian Million.
Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2014.
E 92 M57 2014
They say / I say: the moves that matter in 
academic writing.
Gerald Graff, Cathy Birkenstein & Jim Burke.
New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014.
PE 1431 G73 2014
What great trainers do: the ultimate guide to 
delivering engaging and effective learning.
Robert Bolton & Dorothy Grover Bolton.
New York, NY: AMA, 2016.
HF 5549.5 T7 B5785 2016
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DETAILED	INFO	+	
CORROBORATION	MADE	UP	
FOR	INFORMER	CREDIBILITY
R. v. Dhillon, 2016 ONCA 308
The police received information from 
three  confidential informers that the 
accused was trafficking  heroin and 
crystal methamphetamine. They 
investigated this information which 
included searching  various databases and 
conducting  surveillance. Several months later, the 
investigator and other police officers set up outside 
the accused’s residence. The investigator saw three 
encounters that he believed were drug  transactions. 
In all three, the accused left his home and entered 
the front passenger seat of a vehicle that had pulled 
up in front of his house or into his driveway. 
The first car, a Nissan SUV, arrived at 1:02 pm. It 
was stopped by police shortly after leaving  the 
accused’s residence. The driver fled the car on foot 
but was arrested. He was carrying  approximately 
$3,000 in cash. A black Ford truck arrived at about 
1:06  pm and the accused approach it with 
something  cupped in his hand. The accused entered 
the passenger seat of this truck and then left two 
minutes later empty handed. 
Later, at about 1:40 pm a silver Ford entered the 
accused’s driveway. After the accused got into the 
passenger seat of the Ford, police intervened and 
arrested him. They found 9.3 grams of heroin near 
his feet in the car. The police then entered the home 
believing  exigent circumstances required them to 
secure the residence to preserve evidence and 
ensure  officer safety. There were five  adult women 
and one young  child inside. A search warrant was 
issued and executed later that day. Police found 46.8 
grams of heroin and about 300 grams of 
methamphetamine in a bedroom.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found the investigator had the 
necessary  subjective grounds for arrest 
but those grounds were  not objectively 
reasonable. In the judge’s view, the tipster 
information was not credible nor compelling, and 
there was little material corroboration of the 
trafficking  allegations. Since the arrest was not 
lawful, the accused’s right not to be  arbitrarily 
detained under s. 9 of the  Charter was breached and 
the evidence found in the silver Ford and the 
accused’s home was excluded under s. 24(2). The 
accused was acquitted on three counts of possessing 
heroin and methamphetamine for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
acquittals arguing  the trial 
judge erred in his Charter 
ruling. In the Crown’s opinion, 
the investigator had the necessary grounds to make 
the arrest. The Court of Appeal agreed. Even without 
the information related to the  Nissan driver’s arrest, 
the police still had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused.
The Arrest 
Section 495(1)(a)  of the Criminal Code 
allows a peace officer to make an arrest 
without a warrant when they believe, on 
reasonable grounds, that the person has 
committed or is about to commit an indictable 
offence. The arresting  officer must subjectively  have 
reasonable and probable grounds on which to base 
the arrest and those grounds must be  objectively 
justifiable  to a reasonable person placed in the 
position of the officer.
In this case, the trial judge failed to consider the 
totality  of the circumstances by considering  the 
confidential informer information and the police 
observations in isolation. He also improperly 
discounted the informers’ information due to their 
weak credibility. Justice  Tulloch, speaking  for the 
Court of Appeal, stated:
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In circumstances where confidential informant 
information is at issue, … [o]ne must weigh 
whether the informant was credible, whether the 
information predicting the commission of a 
criminal offence was compelling, and whether 
the information was corroborated by police 
investigation. The totality of the circumstances 
must meet the standard of reasonableness. [para. 
30]
Here, the credibility of the three informers was 
weak. They were all untested. However, the 
information was compelling  and corroborated. “The 
information was fairly  detailed and specific,” said 
Justice Tulloch. “It described various personal 
characteristics of the [accused], the types of drugs 
being  trafficked, where  the transactions occurred, 
and how they were carried out. All the informants 
identified the [accused’s] Alfonso Crescent residence 
as the hub. Two of the confidential informants 
identified the precise address.”
As for corroboration, “the consistency of the 
information from the three informants should be 
given some weight. There was significant overlap in 
their description of the respondent’s nickname and 
name, approximate age, ethnicity, residence, 
vehicle, types of drugs in which he trafficked, 
location at which the transactions occurred, and … 
certain similarities in the manner in which the 
transactions would occur. These consistencies 
increase the significance and reliability of the 
informant information and distinguish this case from 
circumstances in which there is only one 
anonymous or untried informant.” 
Furthermore, the police confirmed the accuracy of 
specific information during  their investigation which 
included: the accused’s name; the colour, make, and 
age of his vehicle; and his ethnicity, address, 
approximate age and that he had been arrested but 
not convicted in relation to the possession of stolen 
property. Police confirmation of these details tended 
to substantiate the reliability of the informers’ 
information. The police observations also provided 
some corroboration that the alleged criminal activity 
was indeed occurring. There were three brief 
meetings within one hour, all of which occurred 
outside the accused’s residence in various cars. This 
behaviour, in light of the  investigator’s knowledge 
and experience, also helped inform the  inferences 
that could be drawn when assessing  the objective 
reasonableness of the grounds for arrest. This 
sequence of events also conformed with the pattern 
predicted by the informer information so as to 
remove the possibility of innocent coincidences. 
Since the police had subjectively  and objectively 
justifiable  reasonable grounds to arrest the accused, 
his s. 9 Charter rights were not breached. The 
Crown’s appeal was allowed and the acquittals were 
set aside. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“In circumstances where confidential informant information is at issue, … [o]ne must 
weigh whether the informant was credible, whether the information predicting the 
commission of a criminal offence was compelling, and whether the information was 
corroborated by police investigation. The totality of the circumstances must meet the 
standard of reasonableness.”
Corroboration Compelling
Credible
Totality of the Circumstances
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PENILE	SWAB	JUSTIFIED	AS	AN	
INCIDENT		TO	ARREST
R. v. Laporte, 2016 MBCA 36
In December 2007 the accused 
approached a 38-year-old woman who 
was waiting  for a taxi. He said he had 
a knife and told her to follow him into 
a building. He hit and punched her, 
fracturing  her nose and other facial bones, and 
forced the woman to have sex with him. The 
accused was arrested shorty after this crime and he 
was taken to the police station. The police took 
penile swabs without his consent and without any 
physical objection. He had been allowed to call his 
lawyer prior to the swabs being  taken. He was 
subsequently released from custody later in 
November 2008.
About two weeks after his release, the accused was 
involved in three more separate sexual assaults all 
committed during  the same day. The first involved an 
eight-year-old boy. This attack was interrupted by a 
neighbour and the accused fled the scene. The 
second incident occurred in an elevator two hours 
later when the accused attacked a woman who was 
with her two-year-old child. He grabbed the woman, 
dragged her towards a stairwell and threatened her 
with a knife. Another tenant intervened and the 
woman and child got away. The third assault 
happened two hours later when the accused 
attacked another woman. This assault was 
interrupted when the building  caretaker heard a 
woman scream. The caretaker threw the accused to 
the ground and held him until police arrived. 
The police took the accused to the police  station 
where  they  again obtained warrantless penile swabs 
from him without his consent. This time, however, 
he struggled vehemently and was not allowed to 
speak to his lawyer. He was subsequently charged 
with nine crimes involving  the four victims which 
included charges of sexual assault causing  bodily 
harm, unlawful confinement and assault with a 
weapon.  A charge of assaulting  a police officer was 
also laid as a result of an officer being  kicked by the 
accused during the arrest. 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused brought a motion under s. 
24(2) of the Charter for the  exclusion of 
the DNA evidence obtained from the 
penile swabs. He argued that the taking 
of the penile  swabs by police, in search of the 
victims’ DNA, breached his rights under s. 8 of the 
Charter to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure since they were  warrantless and 
nonconsensual. As a result, he  asserted that the 
admission of this evidence would bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The Crown 
took the position that the DNA samples were 
lawfully taken as an incident to arrest and a warrant 
was not required.  
The judge found that the taking  of the penile swabs 
without warrant did not fall within the common law 
power of search incident to arrest and that the 
Crown had not demonstrated emergency or exigent 
circumstances for their taking. Nor did police 
consider the availability of a telewarrant under s 
487.1(1)  of the Criminal Code. Therefore, obtaining 
the swabs breached the accused’s s. 8  rights both 
times. The judge, however, allowed the evidence of 
the 2007 DNA swabs under s. 24(2) but excluded 
the 2008 DNA swabs. During  the 2008 swab, the 
police denied the  accused his right to counsel and 
the manner of police conduct was unreasonable 
considering  the number of officers present, the use 
of the spit sock and the amount of force used. 
 
Nevertheless, the accused was convicted of sexual 
assault causing  bodily harm x 3, unlawful 
confinement x 2, assault with a weapon, forcible 
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seizure and assaulting  a police officer.  The accused 
was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced 
to a period of indeterminate incarceration. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions submitting, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
erred in not excluding  the 2007 
DNA evidence.  The Crown, on the other hand, 
argued there  was no s. 8 Charter breach and, if there 
was one, the trial judge properly admitted the 
evidence under s. 24(2) in any event. 
Penile Swabs
The Manitoba Court of Appeal found that a penile 
swab can be taken as a  lawful search incident to 
arrest. Noting  that “the jurisprudence concerning  the 
taking  of penile  swabs is developing”, Justices 
Hamilton and Pfuetzner used other Supreme Court 
of Canada decisions as an analytical framework to 
address the question of whether the taking  of the 
2007 penile swabs breached the accused’s s. 8 
rights. 
“Searches incident to arrest are an established 
exception to the general rule that warrantless 
searches are prima facie unreasonable,” they said. 
“They have an important law enforcement function 
that includes the collection and preservation of 
evidence.” The Court of Appeal continued:
               
The taking  of penile swabs in a sexual assault 
investigation can capture important evidence 
arising from bodily samples from a complainant 
found on the accused person. This is to be 
distinguished from collecting bodily samples 
containing  personal information relating  to an 
accused person, which requires a warrant. … 
Given that distinction, we conclude that the 
taking of penile swabs falls within the existing 
general framework of the common law power of 
a search incident to arrest. [para. 44]
  
The general framework of searching  as an incident 
to arrest was then modified so that the following 
three  elements are required for a penile swab to be a 
lawful search incident to arrest:
1) The police have reasonable and probable 
grounds justifying the arrest;
2) The police have reasonable and probable 
grounds justifying the penile swab search 
incident to arrest. In other words, the police 
have reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that the penile swab will provide 
relevant evidence related to the arrest; and
3) The police have conducted the penile swab 
in a manner that complies with s. 8 of the 
Charter. ... [para. 61]
This modified framework, in the Court’s view, 
provides the appropriate balance between the  law 
enforcement interest in pursing  legitimate police 
investigations of sexual assaults with an accused 
person's significant right to privacy.
“Searches incident to arrest are an 
established exception to the general rule 
that warrantless searches are prima facie 
unreasonable. They have an important 
law enforcement function that includes 
the collection and preservation of 
evidence.”
“The taking of penile swabs in a sexual assault investigation can capture important 
evidence arising from bodily samples from a complainant found on the accused person. 
This is to be distinguished from collecting bodily samples containing personal information 
relating to an accused person, which requires a warrant. … Given that distinction, we 
conclude that the taking of penile swabs falls within the existing general framework of the 
common law power of a search incident to arrest.”
Continued p. 9
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The following questions, adopted from R. v. Golden by the Manitoba Court of Appeal,  
provide a framework for the police (and the courts) in addressing Charter 
compliance.
Strip Search Framework
R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83
Penile Swab Framework
R. v. Laporte, 2016 MBCA 36
1 Can the strip search be conducted at the police station 
and, if not, why not? 
Was the penile swab conducted at the police station and 
if not, why not?
2 Will the strip search be conducted in a manner that 
ensures the health and safety of all involved? 
Was the penile swab conducted in a manner that ensured 
the health and safety of all involved?
3 Will the strip search be authorized by  a police officer 
acting in a supervisory capacity?
Was the penile swab authorized by a police officer acting 
in a supervisory capacity?
4 Has it been ensured that the police officer(s) carrying 
out the strip search are of the same gender as the 
individual being searched?
Were the police officers carrying out the penile swab of 
the same gender as the person being searched, and if 
not, why not?
5 Will the number of police officers involved in the 
search be no more than is reasonably  necessary in 
the circumstances? 
Was the number of police officers involved no more than 
necessary in the circumstances?
6 What is the minimum of force necessary  to conduct 
the strip search? 
Was the minimum force that was necessary used to 
conduct the search?
7 Will the strip search be carried out in a private area 
such that no one other than the individuals engaged in 
the search can observe the search? 
Was the penile swab carried out in a private area such 
that no one other than the individuals engaged in the 
search can observe the search?
8 Will the strip search be conducted as quickly  as 
possible and in a way  that ensures that the person is 
not completely undressed at any one time? 
Was the penile swab conducted as quickly  as possible 
and in a way that ensures that clothing removal or 
exposure is restricted to that necessary to complete the 
swab?
9 Will the strip search involve only a visual inspection of 
the arrestee’s genital and anal areas without any 
physical contact? 
Was the procedure recorded in a respectful manner? For 
example, was the camera turned away during the swab 
procedure or directed at the accused person's back to 
avoid genital exposure?
10 If the visual inspection reveals the presence of a 
weapon or evidence in a body cavity  (not including the 
mouth), will the detainee be given the option of 
removing the object himself or of having the object 
removed by a trained medical professional? 
Was the accused person given the opportunity  to swab 
himself and if not, why not?
11 Will a proper record be kept of the reasons for and the 
manner in which the strip search was conducted? 
Was a proper record kept of the reasons for and the 
manner in which the penile swab was conducted?
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Like strip  searches, penile swabs should be taken at 
the police station:
Strip searches generally should be conducted at 
a police station unless there are exigent 
circumstances. … Given that, and the nature of 
a penile swab search, we expect that it will be 
the rare circumstance that a penile swab will not 
take place in a police station. [paras. 64]
Applying the Penile Swab Framework
In this case, the 2007 swab complied with the Court 
of Appeal’s framework and thus s. 8  of the Charter. 
The police had subjective and objective  reasonable 
and probable grounds to arrest the accused and, in 
the circumstances of the case, they had subjective 
and objective reasonable grounds to believe that 
evidence from the victim could be found on his 
penis. The police provided the accused with two 
opportunities to speak to a lawyer and the swabs 
were taken in an interview room at the police station 
within 12 hours of the attack. The search was 
videotaped, but the swabs were taken off camera. 
The high degree of justification required for the 
penile swab  search existed in the circumstances and 
the evidence was admissible. The  accused’s appeal 
was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.manitobacourts.mb.ca
Editor’s note:  On December 1, 2015 the Supreme 
Court of Canada heard the  appeal of a penile swab 
case out of Alberta (R. v. Saeed, 2014 ABCA 238). In 
that case, the police took a  penile swab without a 
warrant as well. The Saeed judgement was on 
reserve when the Manitoba Court of Appeal released 
Laporte. However, on June 23, 2016 the Supreme 
Court released Saeed. See page 12. 
“Strip searches generally should be 
conducted at a police station unless 
there are exigent circumstances. … 
Given that, and the nature of a penile 
swab search, we expect that it will be the 
rare circumstance that a penile swab will 
not take place in a police station.”
Profession Very or Somewhat Positive Opinion
Nurses 92%
Farmers 91%
Veterinarians 87%
Scientists 86%
Doctors 85%
Teachers 85%
Architects 83%
Engineers 82%
Accountants 79%
Dentists 78%
Police Officers 76%
Actors/Artists 73%
Athletes 72%
Auto Mechanics 70%
Military Officers 69%
Judges 65%
Psychiatrists 64%
Journalists 58%
Building Contractors 57%
Priest/Ministers 56%
Bankers 53%
Realtors/Real Estate Agents 49%
Business Executives 48%
Lawyers 48%
Pollsters 34%
Car Salespeople 30%
Politicians 23%
Source: Insights West, “Nurses and Farmers Seen 
as Canada’s Most Respected Professions”. June 1, 
2016.
Volume 16 Issue 3 - May/June 2016
PAGE 10
SUPREME	COURT	TAKES	
LONGER	TO	DECIDE	CASES
In its report  “Supreme Court of 
Canada - Statistics 2005 to 
2015” the workload of Canada’s 
highest Court was outlined. In 
2015 the Supreme Court heard 
63  appeals, down from 80 in 
2014. The most appeals heard 
annually in the last 10 years 
was in 2008 when 82 were 
brought before the Court. The 
lowest number of appeals heard 
in a single year during  the last decade was 53 in 
2007.
Case Life Span 
The time it takes for the Court to render a judgment 
from the date it hears a case was 5.8 months, up 1.7 
months from 2014. Overall it took 17.2 months, on 
average, for the court to render an opinion from the 
time an application for leave to hear a  case was filed 
in 2015. This is up from the previous year when it 
took 15.5 months. The shortest time within the last 
10 years for the Court to announce its decision after 
hearing  arguments was 4.1 months (2014)  while the 
longest time was 7.7 months (2010). 
Applications for Leave 
In 2015 there were 483 applications for leave to 
appeal the decision of a lower court, meaning  a 
party  sought permission for a hearing  from a three 
judge panel. Ontario was the source of most 
applications for leave at 121 cases. This was 
followed by Quebec (108), the Federal Court of 
Appeal (79), British Columbia (64), Alberta  (48), 
Saskatchewan (16), Nova Scotia (14), Manitoba (12), 
New Brunswick  (8), Newfoundland and Labrador 
(7), the  Northwest Territories (5) and Prince Edward 
Island (1). No applications for leave came from 
Nunavut or the Yukon. Of the 483  leave 
applications, 39 or 8% were granted while 40 were 
pending. Of all applications for leave, 27% were 
criminal and 73% were civil.
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Appeals Heard 
Of the 63 appeals heard in 2015, Quebec had the 
most of any province at 14. This was followed by the 
Federal Court of Appeal with 13, Ontario (12), 
British Columbia  (10), Alberta (8), Manitoba (2), 
New Brunswick, the Yukon, Saskatchewan and 
Newfoundland and Labrador each with one. No 
appeals originated from Nova Scotia, the Northwest 
Territories, Prince Edward Island, or Nunavut. 
Of the appeals heard in 2015, 
5 9 % w e r e c iv i l wh i l e t h e 
remaining  41% were criminal. 
Eighteen percent (18%) of the 
criminal cases dealt with Charter 
issues. 
Fifteen (15) of the appeals heard in 2015 were as of 
right. This source  of appeal includes cases where 
there  was a dissent on a point of law in a provincial 
court of appeal. 
The remaining 48 cases had leave to appeal granted. 
Appeal Judgments 
There were 74 appeal judgments released in 2015, 
down from 77 the previous year. Sixteen (16) 
decisions were delivered from the bench last year 
while the  remaining  58  were  delivered after being 
reserved. Thirty-five (35) appeals were  allowed while 
39 were dismissed. In terms 
of unanimity, the Supreme 
Court agreed on 70% of its 
cases. This is up slightly from 
68% the previous year. For 
the remaining  30% of its 
judgments released in 2015 
the Court was split.  
Source: www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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SUPREME	COURT	UPOLDS	
PENILE	SWABS	AS	AN	INCIDENT	
TO	ARREST
R. v. Saeed, 2016 SCC 24
The police attended a  group home at 
about 5:00 am in response to a 
complaint that a 15-year-old female 
had been sexually assaulted. The 
complainant was taken to the hospital 
where  she was examined. She had bruises, cuts and 
scrapes all over her body, and tenderness to her 
vagina. The accused was arrested at 6:05 am for 
sexual assault after the police attended his 
apartment. He was taken to the police station, but 
mistakenly released sometime between 7:00 am and 
7:30 am only to be re-arrested at 8:35 am. He was 
taken back to the police station, arriving  at 8:50 am, 
and he was allowed to speak to a lawyer, ending  his 
call at 9:20 am. At some point, the police became 
aware  that the sexual assault involved penile 
penetration. 
As a consequence, the accused was placed in a “dry 
cell”, handcuffed to a steel pipe and seated on the 
floor with his hands behind his back to prevent him 
from licking  his hands or washing  away evidence. 
The detective felt there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that the complainant’s DNA would be found 
on the accused’s penis. At 10:40 am a phone call 
with an interpreter was arranged. The police 
repeated the reason for the accused’s arrest and 
again advised him of his rights under s.10(b). He 
indicated he had already spoken to a lawyer and 
knew he did not have  to provide a statement. Police 
explained the process for obtaining  a swab and told 
the accused that he could take the swab  himself, or 
have a male officer take it. 
At 10:45 am, the accused pulled his pants down and 
used a swab with a  cotton tip  to swab along  the 
length of his penis and around its head. There were 
only  two officers in the cell at the time and the small 
window in the door was blocked by the bodies of 
police officers so no one could look in. The swab 
cam into contact only  with the outside skin of teh 
accused’s penis and the procedure took no more 
than two minutes. A subsequent DNA analysis of the 
swab showed DNA matching the complainant.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
A forensic specialist called by the Crown 
provided an expert opinion that the 
complainant’s vaginal DNA would be 
expected to be found on the accused’s 
penis for a  period of time after a sexual assault 
involving  penile  penetration, if no condom was 
used.  He indicated that urination by the accused, 
humidity, warmth, sweat and the natural bacteria 
present on the accused’s skin could all cause this 
type of DNA evidence to degrade. An accused could 
also wash off or wipe away the DNA. However, the 
expert could not definitively state a time frame 
within which a swab  must be taken, due to the many 
factors that affect how long  a complainant’s DNA 
will remain on an accused’s penis — including 
whether the accused chose  to destroy the evidence.  
But, due  to the likelihood that an accused will 
urinate, wash or wipe away the evidence, the expert 
said that a swab should be taken as soon as possible.  
The accused argued the DNA report from the penile 
swab should have been excluded as evidence under 
s. 24(2) of the Charter because his s. 8  rights had 
been breached. The judge agreed, ruling  that the 
taking  of the penile swab violated s. 8 because there 
were no exigent circumstances (the imminent loss of 
evidence)  justifying  the search. The judge found the 
Crown had not established that obtaining  the swab 
was lawful as a search incident to arrest and 
therefore did not overcome the presumptive warrant 
requirement. Nevertheless, the judge found the 
evidence admissible under s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted of sexual assault causing  bodily harm and 
sexual interference.
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Alberta Court of Appeal
A majority of the Court of Appeal 
found the penile swab  in this 
case  was not a proper exercise of 
the police  power to search as an 
incident to arrest and therefore breached s. 8. The 
majority found the character of the penile swab 
more intrusive than a strip  search and more akin to 
obtaining  bodily samples from a suspect (as in R. v. 
Stillman, [1997] 1 SCR 607). Justices Watson and 
Bielby stated:
In sum, unless a statute otherwise provides, a 
warrant is required for any intimate search and 
seizure for bodily samples from the person, 
absent consent, absent evidence which 
establishes that the time required to apply for a 
warrant could result in the bodily samples 
sought significantly deteriorating  or disappearing 
before a search and seizure under warrant could 
be undertaken or absent evidence of extreme 
exigency. Such a search cannot be justified, 
without warrant, simply on the basis of being 
incidental to arrest, without more. [para. 62, R. 
v. Saeed, 2014 ABCA 238]
Thus, the warrantless search and seizure (penile 
swab) was unreasonable under s. 8. However, the 
majority would not exclude the evidence under s. 
24(2).
Justice MacDonald, on the other hand, concluded 
that there was no s. 8 breach because, even in the 
absence  of exigency, the search and seizure was 
proper as an incident to arrest. First, the arrest was 
lawful. Second, the search was related to the reasons 
for the arrest. The arrest was for sexual assault and 
the search was to determine whether the 
complainant’s DNA was on the accused. Finally, the 
search was executed reasonably. The police wanted 
to preserve  the evidence and did so in a respectful 
manner. The accused himself took the sample and 
handed it back to the officer. Furthermore, the officer 
had reasonable and probable grounds to justify the 
search. It was conducted at the police station and 
therefore exigent circumstances were  not required. 
Justice MacDonald also found the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in Stillman  distinguishable. In that 
case, the  police  took samples of the accused‘s own 
bodily substances which would not deteriorate over 
time. In this case, the accused was being  swabbed 
for the DNA of another person (the  complainant) 
which would deteriorate over time. Justice 
MacDonald found the trial judge erred in finding  a s. 
8 breach and the evidence was admissible. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
convictions were upheld. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused appealed 
his convictions again 
suggesting  that his 
rights under s. 8  were 
infringed because the police performed the  penile 
swab without his consent or a warrant  and therefore 
the DNA results ought to have been excluded as 
evidence under s. 24(2). The main issue on appeal 
was whether the police  were entitled to rely on the 
common law power of search incident to arrest to 
take the penile swab. A majority of the Supreme 
Court (7:2)  found the penile swab was lawful as an 
incident to arrest.
Search Incident to Arrest
Under the common law, the police may search a 
person as an incident to arrest. “The common law 
power of search incident to arrest is an ancient and 
venerable power,” said Justice Moldaver speaking  for 
the seven member majority. “For centuries, it has 
proved to be an invaluable tool in the hands of the 
police. Perhaps more than any other search power, it 
is used by the police on a daily basis to detect, 
prevent, and solve crimes. ... By the same token, it is 
an extraordinary power.  Searches incident to arrest 
“The common law power of search incident to arrest is an ancient and venerable power. 
For centuries, it has proved to be an invaluable tool in the hands of the police. Perhaps 
more than any other search power, it is used by the police on a daily basis to detect, 
prevent, and solve crimes.”
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are performed without prior judicial authorization, 
and they inevitably intrude on an individual’s 
privacy interests.” 
However, Courts are tasked with striking  a proper 
balance between the accused’s privacy interests and 
valid law enforcement objectives. Thus, the more 
significant the accused’s privacy interests will be, the 
general framework for searches incident to arrest 
may require modification in order to be Charter-
compliant. 
A General Framework
A reasonable search under the Charter must meet 
the following three requirements:
• The search must be authorized by law;
• The law must be reasonable; and
• The search must be conducted reasonably.
One law that can authorize a warrantless search is 
the common law power of search incident to arrest. 
For a search to be  reasonable under the common 
law, the following general framework applies:
1. The person must be lawfully arrested;
2. The search must be truly  incidental to arrest. 
This means that the search must be for a valid 
law enforcement purpose related to the reason 
for arrest; and
3. The search must be conducted reasonably. 
In some cases, however, the  privacy interest of the 
individual is so high that the general framework 
must be modified and tailored to ensure that this 
heightened privacy interest receives adequate 
protection. An example where this framework has 
been modified is in the case of a strip search. 
Penile Swabs
Before outlining  a Charter-compliant framework for 
the taking  of penile swabs, the majority noted that 
the case of R. v. Stillman did not apply. First, the 
purpose of the penile swab was not to take samples 
of the accused’s own body (his DNA), but rather was 
done to obtain the complainant's DNA. Second, the 
penile swab  was quick and painless, was not 
penetrative and no objects or substances were 
placed inside the accused. Unlike Stillman, the 
swabbing  did not involve the forcible taking  of parts 
of a person. Finally, evidence of the  complainant's 
DNA degrades over time and can be destroyed, 
intentionally or accidentally. As a safeguard to the 
collection of the accused’s DNA, the majority made 
it clear that any of the accused’s DNA collected 
during  this process could not be used for any 
purpose:
[I]f an accused’s DNA is obtained through a 
penile swab and the swab was taken without a 
warrant authorizing such seizure, or the 
accused’s consent, the accused’s DNA cannot be 
used for any purpose. [para. 48; see also para. 
67]
The majority then outlined the framework for taking 
penile swabs incident to arrest:
1. The arrest itself must be lawful;
2. The swab must be truly incident to the 
arrest, in the sense that the swab must be related 
to the reasons for the arrest and it must be 
performed for a valid purpose. The valid purpose 
will generally be to preserve or discover evidence.
3. The police must also have reasonable 
grounds to believe that a penile swab will 
afford evidence of the offence for which the 
accused was arrested. 
4. The penile swab must be conducted  in a 
reasonable manner. The Court outlined a 
number of factors the police must consider in 
performing a penile swab:
(1) The penile  swab should, as a general rule, 
be conducted at the police station. As 
with strip searches, penile swabs should 
generally be performed at the police station.  
This requirement is even stricter for penile 
swabs than strip searches.  Safety concerns 
may justify a strip search for weapons in the 
field. Safety concerns are highly unlikely to 
justify a penile swab in the field.  However, 
the Court did not rule out the possibility that 
a penile swab may reasonably be performed 
in another suitable location, such as a 
hospital, if there is some valid reason for 
doing so. 
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(2) The swab should be conducted in a 
manner that ensures the health  and safety 
of all involved;
(3) The swab should be authorized by a 
police officer acting in a supervisory 
capacity;
(4) The accused should be  informed shortly 
before  the swab of the nature  of the 
procedure for taking the swab, the 
purpose  of taking the swab, and the 
authority of the police to require the 
swab. As a general rule, the police must 
explain to the accused the procedure for 
taking a swab before it is taken, to ensure 
the accused understands the nature of the 
procedure and the steps it involves.  
Reviewing the procedure with the accused 
in advance can only help to keep the 
procedure quick and efficient;
(5) The accused should be given the option of 
removing his clothing and taking the swab 
himself, and if he does not choose  this 
option, the swab should be taken or 
directed by a trained officer or medical 
professional, with  the minimum of force 
necessary. Giving the accused the option of 
taking the swab himself enables the accused 
to minimize the intrusiveness of the 
swab. The police may use force in taking  a 
penile swab incident to arrest, but only if the 
force used is necessary and proportional in 
the specific circumstances. In other words, 
as with strip searches, if the accused resists 
the swab, the police may only use the 
minimum amount of force necessary to 
obtain it. However, the fact that an accused 
resists does not entitle the police “to engage 
in behaviour that disregards or compromises 
his or her physical and psychological 
integrity and safety”; 
(6) The police officer(s)  carrying out the 
penile swab should be of the same gender 
as the individual being swabbed, unless 
the circumstances compel otherwise;
(7) There  should be no more police officers 
involved in the swab than are reasonably 
necessary in the circumstances;
(8) The swab  should be carried out in a 
private area such  that no one other than 
the individuals engaged in the swab  can 
observe it; 
(9) The swab should be conducted as quickly 
as possible and in a way that ensures that 
the person is not completely undressed at 
any one time; and
(10) A proper record should be kept of the 
reasons for and the manner in which the 
swabbing was conducted.  A detailed 
record of how the swab was conducted is 
important for after-the-fact review of these 
searches to be effective and it is likely to 
focus police officers’ attention on whether 
their conduct is reasonable. 
The Court cautioned that these factors will not be 
determinative in every case and “should not be 
taken as deciding  the question of whether a 
penetrative swab performed in accordance with the 
common law police power of search incident to 
arrest would be reasonable and therefore Charter 
compliant.  They are restricted to genital swabs 
conducted on the outer surface of the skin.” Whether 
a particular penile swab incident to arrest accords 
with s. 8  will depend on the individual facts of a 
particular case. 
Reasonable Grounds
The reasonable grounds to believe that a penile 
swab will afford evidence of the offence for which 
the accused was arrested must not be confused with 
the reasonable grounds required for the arrest:
They are independent. Whether reasonable 
grounds have been established will vary with the 
facts of each case.  Relevant factors include the 
timing of the arrest in relation to the alleged 
offence, the nature of the allegations, and 
whether there is evidence that the substance 
being sought has already been destroyed.
For example, the police will generally lack 
reasonable grounds if the alleged sexual offence 
did not involve contact between the suspect’s 
penis and the complainant.  Similarly, if the 
suspect is arrested several days after the alleged 
offence, the police will probably lack reasonable 
grounds because it is likely that the evidence 
will have degraded or been wiped or washed 
away in the interim.
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To be clear, meeting the reasonable grounds 
standard is more than a mere pro forma exercise.  
The potential for destruction or degradation of 
the complainant’s DNA will always be a concern 
in this context.  The greater the time frame 
between the alleged offence and the swab, the 
more difficult it will be for the police to establish 
reasonable grounds for believing  that the swab 
will afford evidence of the offence for which the 
accused was arrested. [paras. 75-77]
Outcome
The majority found the penile swab  in this case did 
not breach s. 8. The arrest was lawful and the police 
were searching  for evidence related to the arrest - 
the complainant’s DNA. The police also had 
reasonable grounds to believe the complainant’s 
DNA had transferred to the accused. The swab  was 
taken several hours after the sexual assault and there 
was no reason to believe the accused had taken 
steps to destroy the evidence. Finally, the swab was 
taken in a reasonable manner. The accused was 
informed in advance of the procedure for taking  the 
swab and the purpose of the swab.  The swab was 
conducted quickly, smoothly, and in private. The 
accused took the swab  himself, there was no 
physical contact with the officers and those 
involved took detailed notes regarding  the reasons 
for and the process of taking the swab.
A Second View
Two justices concluded that the 
warrantless taking  of the penile 
swabs breached s. 8  of the Charter 
because  they were not authorized by 
the the common law power of search incident to 
arrest. Justice Karakatsanis, however, would have 
admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) while Justice 
Abella would have excluded it. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
convictions upheld.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
Editor’s note:  Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Saeed, 2014 ABCA 238.
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INVESTIGATIVE	DETENTION	
TURNED	ARBITRARY	WHEN	
DETAINEE	SHOULD	HAVE	BEEN	
RELEASED
R. v. McGuffie, 2016 ONCA 365
 
At about 2:00 am the police received 
a call from security at a  downtown bar 
reporting  that a group  of five  men in 
the bar were seen passing  a  handgun 
around.  Several police officers 
responded to the call. They found security  staff 
ushering  patrons out from the bar. A doorman 
identified two individuals as part of the group  that 
had been passing  the handgun around. On of them, 
the accused, walked away quickly from the bar. An 
officer followed, caught up to him a  short distance 
from the bar and asked him why he was “running 
away from his friends?” The accused gave conflicting 
responses.  The officer then detained him. He 
suspected the accused had the handgun as seen in 
the bar earlier. But the accused denied having  a 
handgun.
The accused was handcuffed and patted down for 
firearms but nothing  was found. The officer then 
placed the accused in the back of a  police car and 
returned to the bar to assist in the  search for the 
handgun. Thirty minutes later, the officer returned to 
the police car, removed the accused and began a 
more thorough safety  search. During  this search, the 
officer felt a hard rectangular object in the accused’s 
shirt pocket.  Concerned that it might be the 
handgun, he removed the object. It turned out to be 
118.5 grams of powdered cocaine.  The officer 
continued to search the accused and found some 
money and marihuana in his pant pocket.
The accused was arrested for trafficking  in cocaine, 
advised of his right to counsel (now 40 minutes after 
he was first detained). The accused said he wanted 
to speak to a lawyer. He was transported to the 
police station and strip  searched. The officer was 
concerned the accused might still be carrying  a 
handgun, as well as more drugs, even though a 
handgun had already been found by other officers. 
Initially, the accused vigorously resisted the strip 
search but his resistance was overcome by several 
officers, including  the arresting  officer, standing  on 
his ankles. During  the  search, the police found 7.5 
grams of crack cocaine sewn into the  waist of the 
accused’s underwear.  The accused became more 
cooperative and produced 22.7 grams of crack 
cocaine that he had secreted in his buttocks. He was 
then taken into another room to complete the strip 
search.  The door to the room was open and three 
police officers were  in the room.  After the strip 
search was completed, the police gave the accused 
an opportunity to speak to his lawyer, some 90 
minutes after he was first detained.  An hour had 
passed since the accused had indicated he wanted 
to speak to a lawyer. After speaking  with his lawyer, 
the accused told the police his real name and that 
there were warrants outstanding for his arrest. 
Ontario Supreme Court
The officer said he decided to detain the 
accused for possessing  the handgun seen 
earlier in the bar but never suggested to 
have grounds for an arrest. The judge 
found the initial street detention of the accused for a 
R. v. McGuffie Timeline
Time Action
2:00 am Call received from bar security staff that a group of 
men had been seen passing around a handgun.
2:07 am Detaining officer arrives on scene. Other police 
officers already present.
Accused detained and handcuffed.
2:19 am Accused placed in rear of police car.
2:50 am Officer returns to accused - 31 minutes after leaving 
him there. 
Accused again searched and drugs found.
2:55 am Accused arrested.
3:09 am Handgun found on asphalt outside building.
3:25 am Arrived at police station with accused.
3:54 am Strip search completed & accused allowed to contact 
counsel.
Times taken from 2016 ONCA 35 & 2013 ONSC 2097.
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firearm-related investigation was a constitutionally 
appropriate investigative detention. He also held that 
the pat down search was a  reasonable safety-related 
search that did not breach s. 8  of the  Charter. 
However, the judge found the police repeatedly 
violated the accused’s rights from the time he was 
placed in the police car until he was finally 
permitted to speak to his lawyer some 90 minutes 
later. In the judge’s view, detaining  the accused in 
the back of the police car while  the officer went 
back into the bar to assist in the search of the 
handgun ignored the  police obligation to minimize 
the length of the detention, thus breaching  s. 9 of the 
Charter.  The judge compared the officers action to 
others on scene who had briefly detained other 
individuals suspected of having  some connection to 
the firearm but released them when the detention 
provided no grounds for an arrest. 
The officer’s failure to advise  the accused of his right 
to counsel when he first detained him in the police 
car breached s. 10(b), which was further breached 
when the accused was not given an opportunity  to 
speak to his lawyer for an hour after he indicated 
that he wanted to do so. The manner of the  search at 
the police station also breached the accused’s s. 8 
rights. The officer inflicted intentional and gratuitous 
pain by standing  on the accused’s ankles for about a 
minute. The police also failed to adequately respect 
privacy rights when they conducted the strip search 
with the door open and in the presence of officers 
who were unnecessary  for the proper conduct of the 
strip search.  
The judge, however, admitted the evidence under s. 
24(2) of the Charter. The accused was convicted on 
two counts of possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking, three counts of breaching  a recognizance 
and breaching a probation order. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the 
admissibility of the  evidence, 
including  the drugs, against 
h i m . H o w e v e r , b e f o r e 
addressing  the accused’s argument that the trial 
judge erred in admitting  the evidence under s. 24(2), 
the Court of Appeal chose to clearly identify the 
Charter breaches in this case. 
s. 9 - Initial Detention
Justice Doherty, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
first described the competing  interests between the 
police and the accused:
An individual’s right to be left alone by the 
police and the police duty to investigate crime 
and protect the public will inevitably come into 
conflict.  That conflict often plays out in street 
level encounters like the one involving [the 
officer] and the [accused].   Section 9 provides 
the constitutional imperative against which the 
competing  interests of the individual and the 
state, as represented by the police, must be 
balanced and resolved. [para. 32]
In this case, the accused was detained from the 
moment the officer stopped him on the street, which 
was made all the  more obvious when he was 
handcuffed. This initial detention, however, was “a 
lawful exercise of the police power to detain persons 
in the course of a criminal investigation.” The officer 
had the necessary reasonable grounds to suspect 
that the accused was involved in the  illegal 
possession of a  handgun.  The officer had 
information from the doorman, had seen the 
accused quickly  leaving  the area of the bar and the 
location of the handgun was unknown.  “[The 
officer’s] investigation raised legitimate and 
immediate public safety concerns,” said Justice 
“An individual’s right to be left alone by the police and the police duty to investigate crime 
and protect the public will inevitably come into conflict. That conflict often plays out in 
street level encounters ... .  Section 9 provides the constitutional imperative against which 
the competing interests of the individual and the state, as represented by the police, 
must be balanced and resolved.”
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Doherty. “While [the officer] did not have grounds 
to arrest the [accused], he did have a duty to 
investigate the gun-related incident and the 
[accused’s] potential connection to it.”  He 
continued:
An individual may be detained for investigative 
purposes if the police are acting  in the exercise 
of their duty and the detention is justified as 
reasonably necessary in the totality of the 
circumstances. [references omitted, para. 35] 
s. 9 - Continued Detention
Although the initial detention was lawful, the 
continued detention became arbitrary. The officer 
was required to release the accused unless he had 
grounds to arrest him. Here, the officer imprisoned 
the accused when he confined him in the rear of the 
police car while he pursued the investigation 
elsewhere, in the bar. An investigative detention is 
different than an arrest and is designed to be brief:
The significant interference with individual 
liberty occasioned by an arrest is justified 
because the police have reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that the arrested 
person has committed an offence.   Investigative 
detention does not require the same strong 
connection between the detained individual and 
the offence being investigated.   The detention 
contemplated by an investigative detention 
cannot interfere with individual liberty to the 
extent contemplated by a full arrest. 
The duration and nature of a detention justified 
as an investigative detention must be tailored to 
the investigative purpose of the detention and 
the circumstances in which the detention 
occurs.  A brief detention on the street to 
question an individual implicated in a criminal 
investigation involving ongoing events may be 
justifiable under the Mann criteria, but under 
those same criteria imprisonment in a police 
cruiser while handcuffed for some indefinite 
period while an officer carries out other aspects 
of a criminal investigation could not be justified.  
The police cannot use investigative detention as 
an excuse for holding suspects while the police 
search for evidence that might justify the arrest 
of the suspect.   Nor does investigative detention 
mean that the police can detain suspects 
indefinitely while they carry out their 
investigation. [paras. 37-38]
s. 10(b) - Right to Counsel
The right to counsel under s. 10(b) was described by 
the Court of Appeal as follows:
Section 10(b) creates the right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay, and the right to 
be informed of that right without delay.   If a 
detained person, having been advised of his 
right to counsel, chooses to exercise that right, 
the police must provide the detained person 
with a reasonable opportunity to exercise that 
r igh t and mus t re f ra in f rom e l ic i t ing 
incriminatory evidence from the detained person 
until he has had a reasonable opportunity to 
consult with counsel.
 
The rights created by s. 10(b) attach immediately 
upon detention, subject to legitimate concerns 
for officer or public safety. [references omitted, 
para. 41-42] 
In this case, the accused should have been advised 
of his a right to speak to a lawyer no later than 
immediately after he was handcuffed and patted 
down while standing  on the street. He should have 
been asked if he wanted to speak with counsel and, 
if he did, the police should have afforded him that 
opportunity without delay:
“An individual may be detained for investigative purposes if the police are acting in the 
exercise of their duty and the detention is justified as reasonably necessary in the totality 
of the circumstances.”
“The rights created by s. 10(b) attach 
immediately upon detention, subject to 
legitimate concerns for officer or public 
safety.”
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The purpose animating  s. 10(b) applied with full 
force in this case. The [accused] was under the 
control of the police.  He was effectively 
imprisoned from the moment he was handcuffed 
and placed in the cruiser.  [The officer] took 
advantage of that control to subject the 
[accused] to an unconstitutional detention and 
two intrusive unconstitutional searches, both of 
which yielded incriminatory evidence.  The 
[accused] was in serious legal jeopardy.  He 
needed legal advice.  More importantly, he was 
constitutionally entitled to it.  The conduct of the 
police, and specifically [the arresting officer], 
ensured that he would not receive that advice 
until after the police were done with the 
appellant and had the evidence they needed to 
convict him.  The [accused’s] rights under s. 
10(b) were breached. [para. 44]
s. 8 - Unreasonable Search
The Court of Appeal found the initial pat down 
search to be reasonable and justified as an incident 
to investigative detention:
[I]n the circumstances of this case, there is no 
doubt that [the officer] had sufficient grounds to 
believe there was an imminent threat to his 
safety should he confront and detain the 
[accused] on the street for investigative 
purposes.  That reasonable belief of an imminent 
threat could, in my view, be based on the 
reasonable suspicion that the [accused] had the 
handgun.  A cursory pat down search of the 
[accused] was justified to eliminate that 
concern. [para. 52]
However, the more thorough search at the scene and 
the strip search at the police station were  both 
unreasonable. The alleged “safety” search at the 
scene was conducted when the accused was 
unlawfully detained. “I would draw an analogy 
between searches that are said to be lawful as an 
incident of an arrest and safety  searches which are 
said to be lawful as an incident of a  lawful 
investigative detention,” said Justice Doherty. “If the 
arrest is unlawful, the search incidental to the  arrest 
is unlawful and contrary to s. 8. Similarly, if an 
investigative detention is unlawful, a  safety  search 
said to be justified on the basis of that detention 
must be unlawful and contrary to s. 8.” Since the 
accused’s detention in the back of the police car was 
unlawful, the warrantless search of his person could 
not be justified.
The strip search at the police station was also 
performed in an unreasonable manner. The trial 
judge found the  officer gratuitously assaulted the 
accused during  efforts to subdue him by standing  on 
his ankles. Further, the  police failed to take 
reasonable steps to minimize the inherently 
humiliating and degrading impact of the strip search.  
s. 24(2) - Exclusion of Evidence
Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal excluded 
the evidence. The police  misconduct was very 
serious. The officer totally and blatantly disregarded 
the accused’s ss. 8, 9 and 10(b)  Charter rights. As 
well, the breaches seriously impacted of the 
accused’s Charter-protected interests.  None of the 
breaches were technical or minor:
The [accused’s] arbitrary detention effectively 
negated his personal liberty. Not only was he in 
imprisoned, but he was imprisoned in a manner 
that left him vulnerable to further police 
misconduct.  The police took advantage of the 
[accused’s] arbitrary detention to unlawfully 
search the [accused].  That conduct led directly 
to the discovery of incriminating evidence.  The 
“I would draw an analogy between searches that are said to be lawful as an incident of an 
arrest and safety searches which are said to be lawful as an incident of a lawful 
investigative detention. If the arrest is unlawful, the search incidental to the arrest is 
unlawful and contrary to s. 8. Similarly, if an investigative detention is unlawful, a safety 
search said to be justified on the basis of that detention must be unlawful and contrary 
to s. 8.”
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strong causal connection between the denial of 
the [accused’s] liberty, the unconstitutional 
search of his person, and the subsequent 
obtaining  of the incriminating  evidence speaks 
to the profound impact of the breaches on the 
[accused’s] Charter-protected interests. 
The [accused’s] interests protected by s. 10(b) of 
the Charter were completely compromised by 
the police conduct. Detained persons are 
constitutionally entitled to know of their right to 
that advice, and to a reasonable opportunity to 
access that advice.   Access to legal advice while 
detained is fundamental to individual liberty and 
personal autonomy in a society governed under 
the rule of law. 
The [accused] was not made aware of his right 
to speak to counsel until after [the officer] had 
searched him and found drugs.  Even then, the 
[accused] was not given an opportunity to 
exercise his right to counsel, despite expressing 
his desire to do so.  Instead, he was subjected to 
a second unconstitutional search which 
discovered yet further evidence.  Had the 
[accused] been afforded an opportunity to speak 
to counsel before the strip search, it may well be 
that the strip search would have been 
unnecessary. 
The significant negative impact of the 
unconstitutional strip search on the [accused’s] 
privacy rights is obvious. The police misconduct 
was highly intrusive and struck at the core of 
even the most restrictive notion of personal 
privacy. [paras. 79-82]
Since the drugs were excluded, the accused was 
acquitted on the possessing  cocaine for trafficking 
charges. The other convictions were also overturned. 
Had the  Charter been respected, the accused would 
have been released after his initial detention and 
never identified. Thus, none of the other charges 
would have been laid. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note:  Additional facts taken from R. v. 
McGuffie, 2013 ONSC 2097.
‘CLEAR	&	CONVINCING’	IS	THE	
STANDARD	FOR	ONTARIO	
POLICE	DISCIPLINARY	MATTERS	
Jacobs v. Ottawa (Police Service), 
2016 ONCA 345
 
A police officer was charged with one 
count of Unnecessary Exercise of 
Authority under Ontario’s Code of 
Conduct for allegedly using  unnecessary 
force in the course of an arrest. In 
reaching  her decision, the hearing  officer applied 
the civil standard of proof on a “balance of 
probabilities” by relying  on the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in F.H. v. McDougall, 
2008  SCC 53  rather than the  higher standard of 
“clear and convincing evidence” found in s. 84(1) of 
Ontario’s Police Services Act (PSA)  as argued by the 
officer. The officer was found guilty after a  four day 
disciplinary hearing  and the “penalty of forfeiture of 
12 days’ time” was imposed.
Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC)
The officer’s appeal of his conviction to the  OCPC 
was dismissed. The OCPC found the standard of 
proof in police discipline matters was on a balance 
of probabilities.
Ontario  Divisional Court
The officer sought judicial 
review but his application was 
dismissed.  The Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice Divisional Court 
found that the existence of an intermediate standard 
of proof was rejected in McDougall. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The of f icer appealed the 
Div i s iona l Cour t ’s ru l ing 
asserting  that s. 84(1) of the PSA 
mandates a standard of proof 
that lies somewhere between a balance of 
probabilities and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It was the officer’s view that the hearing  officer, the 
OCPC and the Divisional Court erred in finding  that 
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the standard of proof is a balance of probabilities. 
The Chief of Police, complainant and the OCPC, on 
the other hand, suggested that the the standard of 
proof for finding  police misconduct was a balance of 
probabilities. They contended that “clear and 
convincing  evidence” describes the quality  of 
evidence generally required to meet the balance of 
probabilities standard in professional discipline 
matters and that this quality of evidence applies 
equally to police officers prosecuted under the PSA.
Police Services Act (PSA)
Section 84(1) of the PSA states:
If at the conclusion of a hearing under 
subsection 66 (3), 68 (5) or 76 (9) held by the 
chief of police, misconduct as defined in section 
80 or unsatisfactory work performance is proved 
on clear and convincing evidence, the chief of 
police shall take any action described in section 
85. [emphasis added]
The Court of Appeal concluded that the Divisional 
Court erred in relying  on McDougall, which 
considered the civil standard of proof at common 
law in a civil claim alleging  sexual assault. 
“McDougall did not purport to establish a universal 
standard applicable to statutory standards of proof,” 
said Justice Hourigan. “It is well-settled that it is 
within the authority of a legislature to create a 
standard of proof specific to a particular statute.” 
The Court of Appeal found it was bound by the  case 
of Penner v. Niagara, 2013  SCC 19 that “the 
standard of proof in PSA hearings is a higher 
standard of clear and convincing  evidence and not a 
balance of probabilities.” The officer’s appeal was 
allowed, the order of the Divisional Court dismissing 
the application for judicial review was set aside, and 
the matter was remitted to the OCPC for further 
consideration in light of these reasons .
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“[T]he standard of proof in PSA hearings  is a higher standard of clear and convincing 
evidence and not a balance of probabilities.”
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DISHONEST	POLICE	TESTIMONY	
RELEVANT	TO	SERIOUSNESS	OF	
CHARTER	BREACH
R. v. Pino, 2016 ONCA 389
 
The police received a tip about a 
suspected marijuana “grow-op” at a 
house. They reviewed hydro records of 
electricity usage in the  neighbourhood 
and noticed a house across the street 
from the target residence also had a pattern of high 
electricity usage. Other signs - unusual heat patterns 
from the house, an unusual number of vents on the 
roof and an odour of marijuana around the  house - 
suggested this second house was being  used as a 
grow-op. The police obtained warrants to search 
both homes, the original target residence and the 
one across the street. 
Before executing  the warrants, the police surveilled 
the area. Just after noon, the  accused was seen 
coming  out of the second residence carrying  a box, 
which she put in the trunk of her car. When she 
drove away at 12:48  am, the police followed. She 
drove to a Value Village and met a man. The accused 
slid over to the passenger seat and the man took 
over driving. At this point, the detective ordered the 
accused’s arrest. The car was stopped about 1:00 pm 
and both occupants were arrested. 
The police searched the car and found a  box in the 
trunk. The box was opened and 50 marihuana clone 
plants were discovered. At 3:34 pm a search warrant 
was executed at the  second residence and police 
found a large marihuana grow operation. The 
accused was charged with possessing  marihuana 
(the 50 plants) for the purpose of trafficking.
Ontario Court of Justice
At trial, the accused, along  with the male 
driver, described the arrest as follows: 
• an unmarked police car cut their vehicle 
off;
• the detective was dressed in black, his face 
covered with a balaclava and he was armed with a 
handgun
• The detective got out of the car, pointed his gun at 
the them and shouted aggressively. 
• The accused was arrested, handcuffed and made 
to sit on the curb. 
The detective, on the other hand, denied he drew his 
gun and claimed the arrest was “like a regular traffic 
stop.” A second officer on scene for the arrest said 
he did not remember whether the detective pulled 
his gun. The judge rejected the detective’s evidence 
and did not accept the other officer’s explanation 
that he did not remember. 
The judge found the police breached the accused’s 
Charter rights. The police  carried out the arrest by a 
dangerous and unnecessary masked take-down at 
gunpoint. This was unreasonable even though the 
police had reasonable grounds to arrest the accused 
and conduct a  search incidental to arrest. Since the 
police did not have justification for the way they 
arrested the vehicle’s occupants, the manner of 
arrest and subsequent search were unreasonable and 
breached s. 8 of the Charter. 
Further, the judge concluded that the police 
breached the accused’s s. 10(b) rights. First, her s. 10 
(b)  informational right were infringed. The detective 
misinformed the accused about her right to counsel. 
He failed to advise her of her right to counsel 
without delay and “probably” failed to advise her of 
her right to free, immediate legal advice. The 
detective was not carrying  his duty book, which 
contained a pre-written “rights to counsel” card and 
relied only on his memory. However, he  had 
difficulty describing  what he told the accused on 
cross-examination. 
Second, the police breached the accused’s s. 10 (b) 
implementational rights. They unnecessarily delayed 
access to counsel by  holding  her incommunicado in 
a jail cell for almost 5 1/2 hours after her arrest. 
Although a reasonable period in suspending  her 
access to counsel was justified to prevent the 
impending  search warrant execution from being 
compromised, once this reasonable period had 
passed the accused was left in her cell and not 
afforded an opportunity  to consult with a lawyer 
until some time later. 
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Despite these breaches, the judge admitted the 
evidence under s. 24(2). In his view, the  s. 10(b) 
violations occurred after the  marihuana was seized. 
Therefore, he could not consider these breaches in 
his s. 24(2) analysis no matter how serious they were 
because  they did not meet the “obtained in a 
manner” requirement. As for the s. 8 breach, the 
judge found this to be “far from the extreme end of 
seriousness”. He speculated that the officer drew his 
gun for safety reasons and only lied because he had 
not filed a use of force report. As for the impact of 
this breach on the accused, it was of “moderate” 
significance on her Charter-protected interests. 
Finally, excluding  the marihuana, which was real 
and reliable evidence, would “gut the prosecution”. 
The accused was convicted of possessing  marihuana 
for the purpose of trafficking.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed her 
conviction arguing  the trial 
judge erred by not considering 
the two s. 10(b)  breaches in the 
24(2) analysis. As well, she contended that the  judge 
understated the seriousness of the s. 8  breach and 
failed to properly consider the  police testimonial lies 
in not excluding the evidence. 
Obtained in a Manner
Justice Laskin, delivering  the Court of Appeal 
decision, found the two s. 10(b)  breaches and the s. 
8  breach met the “obtained in a  manner” 
requirement under s. 24(2). The connection between 
the evidence and a Charter breach may be causal, 
temporal, contextual or any combination 
of the three. In this case, the marihuana seized from 
the trunk of the car and all three Charter breaches 
were part of the same transaction:
The connection between the evidence and the 
breaches is both temporal and contextual, and is 
neither too tenuous nor too remote. The 
connection is temporal because the three 
breaches are relatively close in time and are part 
of a continuum straddling [the accused’s] arrest. 
The connection is also “contextual”. I take 
“contextual” – a word often used by lawyers and 
judges – to mean pertaining  to the surroundings 
or situation in which something happens. In this 
case, the something that happened is [the 
accused’s]  arrest. And the two s. 10(b) breaches 
and the s. 8  breach surrounded her arrest or 
arose out of it. Indeed, the trial judge found that 
the s. 10(b) breaches form “part of the context” 
in which the s. 8 breach occurred. [para. 74]
Police Lies
Justice Laskin found the trial judge erred in 
understating  the police  officer’s dishonest testimony 
by speculating  and attributing  rather innocuous 
motives for lying:
The trial judge suggested that [the detective] 
drew his gun for reasons of “officer safety”. He 
speculated that the officer may have lied about 
doing so not because he knew all along  his 
conduct was unlawful, but because he had not 
filed a use of force report.
I do not think the trial judge was justified in 
proffering  these explanations for [the detective’s] 
testimony, explanations that had the effect of 
understating  the seriousness of his dishonesty. 
No evidence was led at trial to show that the 
arrest of [the accused] posed any risk to either 
officer’s safety. And no evidence was led to 
explain why [the detective] pulled his gun or 
why he lied about doing  so. Indeed, neither 
officer could give any evidence about the gun 
because one denied and the other claimed not 
to remember whether [the detective] had 
brandished his weapon during the arrest.
It seems to me that if the two police officers 
were going to justify their conduct, they were 
obliged to put forward evidence explaining why 
[the detective] drew his gun and why he acted 
aggressively in carrying out the arrest of [the 
s. 24(2) Charter
Where ... a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any 
rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established 
that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute.
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accused]. These explanations could only come 
from the officers. Although [the accused] had the 
ultimate burden under s. 24(2) to show the 
marijuana should be excluded, on this issue of 
the police’s conduct, the Crown had the burden 
to put forward a plausible explanation. It did not 
and could not do so.
As ... counsel for [the accused] pointed out, by 
suggesting fairly innocent explanations for the 
police officers’ testimony, the trial judge allowed 
them to benefit from their own dishonesty. They 
were able to shield their true motives for the way 
they carried out the arrest of [the accused] by 
lying about their own misconduct. For the 
purpose of assessing the seriousness of the 
Charter breaches and the overall assessment of 
whether the marijuana should have been 
excluded from the evidence at trial, the officers’ 
dishonest testimony should not be understated 
by explanations unsupported in the evidence. 
[reference omitted, paras. 94-97]
s. 24(2) Charter
 
Given that the  trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) 
determination, the Court of Appeal excluded the 
evidence after conducting  its own analysis. First, the 
three breaches were near the extreme end of 
seriousness. This favoured exclusion as the 
“admission of the evidence in the light of the 
seriousness of the breaches, and especially the 
officers’ dishonest testimony, may send the message 
that the justice system condones this kind of 
conduct.” Second, the s. 10(b) breaches increased 
the impact on the  accused’s Charter-protected 
interests. “These breaches were neither technical nor 
fleeting,” said Justice Laskin. “Being  forced to sit 
alone in a jail cell for over five hours after her arrest 
without access to counsel undermined the very 
interests s. 10(b) seeks to protect: correct information 
about the right to counsel and the immediate ability 
to consult with a lawyer. [The accused] was 
vulnerable and she  needed counsel, not just for legal 
advice, but as a lifeline to the outside world.” This 
also favoured exclusion of the evidence. Society’s 
interest in an adjudication on the merits, however, 
favoured admission. The marihuana was both real 
and reliable evidence and its exclusion would end 
the prosecution. On balance, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the admission of the  marijuana 
would bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute; “the court’s need to disassociate itself 
from the police’s conduct is greater than society’s 
interest in prosecuting  [the accused] for possessing 
50 marijuana plants.”
The accused’s appeal was allowed, her conviction 
set aside and an acquittal was entered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
BESTIALITY	MORE	THAN	SEX	
ACT	WITH	ANIMAL
R. v. D.L.W., 2016 SCC 22
The accused brought the family dog 
into a bedroom, applied peanut butter 
to his teenage step daughter’s vagina, 
and then photographed the dog 
licking  her. He then asked her to do it 
again so he could video it. He was charged with 
bestiality along  with other offences alleged to have 
been committed over years of repeated sexual 
molestation. These other charges included sexual 
assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual 
touching, sexual exploitation, and making  and 
possessing child pornography. 
British Columbia Supreme Court 
The judge found that the term “bestiality” 
included acts of sexual touching  with 
animals and penetration was not an 
element of the offence. Since the accused 
had encouraged the complainant to commit 
bestiality and had used peanut butter, he was a party 
to the offence under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code. 
The accused was convicted of bestiality, along  with 
the other 13  sexual offences, and he was sentenced 
to 16 years in prison.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed only the 
bestiality conviction arguing 
that penetration was a  required 
element of the offence. He 
argued that the trial judge statutorily misinterpreted 
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the bestiality provision by failing  to find that the 
Crown was required to prove penetration. The 
Crown, on the other hand, submitted that a  proper 
interpretation of the meaning  of bestiality would 
include sexual activity of any kind between a person 
and an animal. 
A two member majority of the Court of Appeal ruled 
that penetration remained an element of the offence 
of bestiality  as it had been in the common law. The 
majority concluded that previous amendments to 
legislation had not changed the elements of this 
offence to include a broader range of sexual conduct 
with animals. Since penetration remained an 
element of bestiality  and there was no act of 
penetration in this case, the appeal was allowed and 
an acquittal was entered on the bestiality charge.
A dissenting  judge was of the view that a change to 
the Criminal Code  amended the offence of bestiality 
such that it did not require penetration and he would 
have allowed the appeal. “ 
Supreme Court of Canada
The Crown appealed 
the accused’s acquittal 
o n t h e b e s t i a l i t y 
charge  arguing  that 
any sexual activity between a  human and an animal 
would suffice while the accused continued to 
contend that bestiality  required penetration as an 
element. 
Bestiality
The Supreme Court examined the history of the 
offence for bestiality and noted the following:
• Parliament has never defined the elements of 
bestiality;
• It is a very old crime and has also been referred 
to as a type of sodomy or buggery;
• Until at least 1955 the term bestiality was 
understood to mean buggery with animals;
• Legislative changes in 1955 and 1988 did not 
expand the offence of bestiality to all human-
animal sexual activity. Penetration was still 
required;
• Sexual penetration has always been one of its 
essential elements;
• Parliament, not judges, need to change the 
elements of the offence. 
The six member majority judgment held that “the 
offence of bestiality under s. 160(1)  of the Criminal 
Code  required sexual intercourse between a human 
and an animal.” Penetration was required. The 
Crown’s appeal was dismissed and the accused’s 
acquittal was upheld.
A Different View
In her dissenting  opinion, Justice Abella 
concluded that the 1988  amendment to 
the Criminal Code rendered penetration 
irrelevant. After examining  the language, 
history and evolving  social landscape of the 
bestiality provision, she stated:
I do not see the absence of a requirement of 
penetration as broadening the scope of bestiality. 
I see it more as a reflection of Parliament’s 
common sense assumpt ion tha t s ince 
penetration is physically impossible with most 
animals and for half the population, requiring it 
as an element of the offence eliminates from 
censure most sexually exploitative conduct with 
animals. Acts with animals that have a sexual 
purpose are inherently exploitative whether or 
not penetration occurs, and the prevention of 
sexual exploi ta t ion i s what the 1988 
Amendments were all about. [para. 149]
Justice Abella would have allowed the Crown’s 
appeal, set aside the  acquittal and restored his 
conviction. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
Positive Opinions of CJS Professions - BC
Police Officers 80%
Judges 66%
Lawyers 49%
Politicians 21%
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GROUNDS	FOR	ARREST	
DETERMINED	BY	TOTALITY	OF	
CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Pham, 2016 ONCA 258
 
A police officer reported that an SUV 
was being  driven unsafely. Another 
officer followed this vehicle for several 
kilometers and pulled it over. While the 
officer waited for the two occupants to 
produce the information he requested, particularly 
from the accused driver, he  made several 
observations. Both occupants seemed nervous and 
the accused kept looking  back towards two large 
black suitcases in the rear of the vehicle. He 
observed several cellphones on the console and air 
fresheners hanging  from the rear-view mirror. A 
strong  smell of raw marijuana was detected from the 
vehicle. 
As the officer walked by the vehicle to return to his 
cruiser, he noticed a cardboard box in the cargo 
area of the vehicle. It had Ziploc bags protruding 
from it that contained material of the shape and size 
of marijuana. These observations were made through 
heavily tinted windows. After the officer conducted 
a CPIC check, he returned to the vehicle and 
arrested the accused and her passenger for 
possessing  marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. 
However, he delayed advising  the accused of her 
right to counsel for some three to four minutes. In 
the vehicle, police found 48  pounds of packaged 
marihuana.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused was convicted of possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking 
and sentenced to six  months in jail.  The 
judge found both the traffic stop and the 
accused’s arrest to be  lawful. However, he 
concluded that the police  breached s. 10(b)  of the 
Charter because the arresting  officer did not inform 
the accused of her s.10(b) rights immediately upon 
arrest. Despite this Charter breach, however, the 
evidence was admitted under s. 24(2). 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed her 
conviction arguing, in part, that 
the police lacked reasonable 
grounds to detain her and 
therefore had no lawful authority to search her 
vehicle incident to arrest. She also contended that 
the evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 
24(2). 
But the Court of Appeal disagreed with all these 
submissions. First, the stop was legal:
We are satisfied, as the [accused] acknowledges, 
that the initial traffic stop was fully justified 
under s. 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. The 
same may be said of the request for documents 
identifying  the occupants and the authority of 
the driver to operate the vehicle with appropriate 
insurance coverage. Any additional purpose the 
officer had was neither improper nor did it entail 
an infringement on the liberty or security of the 
occupants beyond what is contemplated by the 
purpose animating s.216(1) of the Highway 
Traffic Act. [para. 7]
As for the marihuana possession arrest, the 
investigating  officer had the requisite  reasonable and 
probable grounds:
“The cumulative effect of these observations amounted to reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest the [accused]. It followed that the search of the vehicle incident to the 
lawful arrest and carried out in a reasonable manner was constitutionally valid.”
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When the officer reached the vehicle, he 
detected a strong odour of raw marijuana. New 
air fresheners hung from the rear-view mirror. 
Several cellphones were in the vehicle. Both 
occupants were nervous. The [accused] 
repeatedly looked back at the large bags in the 
rear seat or cargo area. The officer noticed a 
large box with bags containing a substance that 
resembled marijuana in size and shape 
protruding from it. The cumulative effect of these 
observations amounted to reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest the [accused]. It 
followed that the search of the vehicle incident 
to the lawful arrest and carried out in a 
reasonable manner was constitutionally valid. 
[para. 9]
As for the s. 10(b)  Charter breach, it did not warrant 
the exclusion of evidence. Although the police failed 
to advise the accused of her right to counsel 
immediately upon arrest, the informational 
component of the right was delayed only three to 
four minutes. The investigating  officer did call the 
toll-free number for duty counsel and requested a 
response from a Vietnamese-speaking  lawyer. There 
was no reason to interfere with the trial judge’s 
decision to admit the marihuana found in the 
vehicle.
The accused’s appeal from her conviction was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
NO	THREATS	OR	PROMISES:	
STATEMENT	VOLUNTARY
R. v. Toope, 2016 NSCA 32
A Street Crime Enforcement Unit 
executed a  search warrant at the 
accused’s home, where he lived with 
his parents. He was arrested at about 
11:00 am outside his home. A 
cellphone, $1,000 cash and a  marijuana joint were 
found on him. He was taken to the police station 
and provided an opportunity to consult with counsel 
while police searched his home. In his bedroom, 
police found 97 orange hydromorphone pills and 
other evidence. Seven marihuana plants were found 
outside behind the garage. They were growing  in 
plastic cups. 
At 2:28  p.m., the police began questioning  the 
accused at the police station for just over an hour. 
The interview was videotaped, during  which the 
accused admitted ownership  of the marijuana plants 
and the pills, but said the pills were  for his personal 
use.
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
The accused argued his confession was 
not voluntary because he was induced 
and coerced by the police. He said he 
was anxious, felt pressured and was 
intimidated by  police when they asserted that his 
parents might be  charged with producing  marijuana 
if he did not accept responsibility for the plants 
found in the back  of his parents’ property. He also 
said he believed his release  from custody was 
connected to whether he cooperated. 
The judge found that the process followed by  teh 
police was not oppressive and that there were no 
threats or promises made. “The video of that 
interview process showed anything  but an 
oppressive exercise,” said the judge. “The 
demeanour of [the  interviewer] was professional and 
respectful. There were no threats or promises.” The 
judge concluded that the  accused had an operating 
mind, and, considering  the  entire  context of the 
interview, his confessions were voluntary. The 
a c c u s e d w a s c o n v i c t e d o f p o s s e s s i n g 
hydromorphone for the purpose trafficking, 
production of marihuana and breach of a probation 
order.
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused submitted that the 
trial judge erred in finding  his 
confessions to the  police  were 
voluntary. He again contended 
that he was coerced and induced by the police  into 
confessing that he owned the plants and the pills. 
“The video of that interview process showed 
anything but an oppressive exercise”
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Confessions
A statement made to the police must be voluntarily 
given. In deciding  whether a  statement was 
voluntary, a court must consider the context of the 
interview in its entirety, including  the following 
relevant factors (R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38):
• Threats or promises - quid pro quo offer;
• Oppression  such as depriving  a detainee of 
food, clothing, water, sleep, medical attention, 
or access to counsel, or whether the interviewee 
was confronted with fabricated evidence or was 
questioned aggressively for a prolonged period 
of time;
• Operating  mind  - whether the accused knew 
what he was saying  and that it might be used to 
his detriment; or 
• Police trickery  - whether the methods employed 
by the police were so appalling  as to shock the 
community.
Justice Hamilton, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
found the  trial judge properly  applied the law to the 
facts in concluding  that the accused’s statement was 
voluntarily given. 
I am satisfied the judge applied the correct legal 
test in determining  that the [accused’s] 
confessions were voluntary. In reaching  his 
conclusion, he considered the context of the 
interview in its entirety, as Oickle directs. He 
specifically referred to the factors Oickle directs 
be considered, and that were relevant to the 
case before him. He made no palpable and 
overriding  error in finding the plants were not 
found until after the [accused] was taken to the 
police station and consequently that the 
appellant could not have been coerced by the 
police telling him his parents would be charged 
if he did not admit to owning the plants.
A review of the video of the interview confirms 
that he made no palpable and overriding error in 
finding that the police did not induce the 
[accused] to confess. He correctly found that 
during  the interview the police did not suggest 
he would be released if he admitted ownership 
of the pills. [paras. 29-30]
The accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org  
Here’s what the trial judge found:
• The officer was aware of the accused’s 
anxiety and offered a number of times to 
get water for him if he wanted any. 
• The officer avoided drawing any 
connection between the success of the 
interview and possible release from 
custody, despite repeated efforts by the 
accused to do so.
• The officer was aware that the accused 
was concerned that a finding of guilt in this 
matter could hurt his efforts to educate 
himself and gain employment in addictions 
counselling. But the officer was careful not 
to draw any connection to the success of 
the interview with favourable treatment 
by the police authorities. 
• There was nothing in the exchanges 
between the accused and the officer that 
would have or could have caused him to 
believe that he had no choice but to say 
whatever the officer wanted him to say.
• Nothing in the procedure followed, the 
words spoken or the actions taken by the 
police interfered with the accused’s 
operating mind and the decisions he made 
to speak or remain silent.
• The officer did nothing to improperly 
induce the accused to make any 
admissions against his own interests.
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